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On April 2, 1981, the European Option Exchange introduced the first organized exchange 
trading of options on spot gold. We study this new market for three months at its inception and 
in a parallel period a year later via various tests of rational boundary conditions. Additionally, 
we use call-put parity to infer implied risk free rates (IRFR's). Deviations of the IRFR's from 
the prevailing risk free rate permit the possibility of arbitrage through positions known as 
forward and reverse conversions. Our tests are modified to allow for transaction costs to more 
fully address the question of market efficiency. 
1. Introduction 
On April 2, 1981, the European Options Exchange (EOE) in Amsterdam 
introduced options on gold. Gold options have been sold by the Mocatta 
Metals Corporation of New York since 1973 and call options on gold futures 
have been actively traded on the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange since 1979. 
However, the EOE provided the first organized exchange for the trading in 
options whose payoff is directly contingent upon the price of gold. 
Since the opening and the subsequent expansion of the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange (CBOE) there have been a number of investigations 
concerning option market efficiency [for example, Galai (1978), Chiras and 
Manaster (1978), Macbeth and Merville (1979), Rubinstein (1981), and 
Bhattacharya (1983)]. At the time of these studies, the CBOE, AMEX, 
Pacific, and Philadelphia exchanges dealt only in options on selected 
common stocks. The assets upon which options are written now includes 
commodities, precious metals, bonds, and futures contracts, and some studies 
examining these option markets are beginning to appear [Figlewski and 
Fitzgerald (1982), and Camerer (1982)]. 
The EOE gold options market provides an opportunity for the study of 
the behavior of a new options market and the characteristics of option 
pricing when the underlying asset is physical rather than financial. We 
*We would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions, the European 
Options Exchange for providing the data, and William Keller, Lynn McMillan, and Hon-Meng 
Tang for their research assistance. 
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investigate the effect of newness by examining the gold options market both 
at its inception and in a parallel period one year later. A signficant research 
advantage to this market is that the carrying costs on gold are negligible 
implying a negligible convenience yield; 1 that is, gold receives no dividends. 
Furthermore, transaction costs on gold are minimal [Tschoegl (1980)]. The 
aims of this paper therefore are to exploit these advantages in investigating 
the efficiency of the gold options market at its inception and one year later. 
Section 2 provides institutional information about the EOE and its gold 
options. Section 3 describes our data for both the 1981 and 1982 periods. We 
then test whether or not the observed prices satisfy rational option pricing 
boundary conditions in section 4. Section 5 uses call-put parity to derive 
implied risk free rates and statistically examines their behavior while section 
6 provides a summary and conclusions. 
2. The gold options market of the EOE 
The gold options market of the EOE is a central market for trading gold 
options. Trading follows the pattern devised for the stock options market of 
the EOE, established in April 1978, but under separate rules and regulations. 
One can trade both call and put options. That is, a gold option as listed on 
the EOE gives the holder the right (not the obligation) to purchase, in the 
case of a call, or to sell, in the case of a put, ten troy ounces of gold at a 
predetermined price, at any time up to the expiration date of the option. 
Gold options, therefore, are of the 'American' type. There are four possible 
expiration months in each year (February, May, August and November), of 
which normally three are open to trading. The expiry date is the Saturday 
following the third Friday of the expiration month. Gold options trade and 
are settled in US dollars per troy ounce. The EOE sets exercise prices at 
intervals of US$25. Whenever the price of gold moves substantially, the EOE 
introduces a new exericse price. 
All options trade by an open outcry auction system at the trading post of 
the Gold Options Market of the EOE between 10:30a.m. and 4:30p.m. 
(local time). An order book official, responsible for overseeing the trading in 
gold options, supervises the trading post. His duties include holding limit 
orders placed in the book and displaying the highest bid and lowest offer, 
together with the number of contracts bid and offered. Table 1 summarizes 
the transactions costs (to the public) on gold options. These costs should be 
contrasted with those Phillips and Smith (1980, table 1) estimated for the 
CBOE of US$10-$65/option contract. 
1We thank Jim Hoag and Mark Rubinstein for pointing this out to us. However, the 
convenience yield to other precious metals is not necessarily negligible. Hoag's empirical 
analyses [Hoag (1971,1982)] suggests a substantial convenience yield to silver yet a negligible 
one for gold. 
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Table 1 
Transactions costs. 
Type and value of transaction Commission 
Opening orders 
Less than ten contracts 
Ten contracts (one round lot) 
More than ten contracts 
Closing orders 
Less than ten contracts 
Ten contracts (one round lot) 
More than ten contracts 
Combination orders 
Less than ten contracts 
Ten or more contracts 
$10 per contract subject to a minimum 
of $25 per order 
$80 per order 
$80 plus $8 per contract over 10 
contracts 
$3 per contract subject to a minimum 
of $10 per order 
$10 per order 
$20 plus $2 per contract over 10 
contracts 
$8 per opening contract and $2 per 
closing contract subject to a minimum 
of $25 per order 
$8 per opening contract and $2 per 
dosing contract subject to a minimum 
of $25 per order 
Recently the Montreal Stock Exchange announced that it has agreed with 
the EOE to establish a joint gold options market. Options bought on one 
exchange could be sold on the other. This will permit gold options trading 
over 12 consecutive hours. 
3. Data 
Our data consists of daily price and volume information for gold options 
at the EOE for the period April through June in 1981 and for the 
corresponding period in 1982. This includes the initial 56 trading days in 
1981, and some 60 days in 1982. 
As previously mentioned, the option contracts have 3 months between 
expiration dates so that on a given day the time to maturity on available 
options will be z, z + 0.25 and z +0.5 years where 0 < z <0.25. The EOE 
originally selected exercise prices such that the options were close to the 
money. Initially (i.e., on April 2, 1981), the price of gold was $520.50 and call 
exercise prices were set at $500, $525 and $550. As the price of gold declined, 
the EOE introduced exercise prices of $475 and $450. On average, in both 
periods there were approximately 20 possible put and call contracts tradeable 
per day. 
The data available provides closing prices corresponding to the last traded 
price of the day, and when no trade occurs the ask price is recorded. The 
only exceptions occur if either the last transaction occurs at a price below 
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the bid price of the closing quotation when the bid price is employed or 
when the last transaction occurs "at a price above the ask price of the closing 
quotation when the ask price is employed. In either case the last traded price 
is not indicative of the closing price. 
The listed price of the underlying security is the daily p.m. fixing in the 
London gold market. Table 2 presents gold's p.m. fixing price behavior for 
the two periods. In the first period, the gold price rose at first, and then fell. 
In the second it rose, fell, and rose again to a level close to that at the 
beginning of the period. 
Table 3 summarizes the option volume data for the two periods. 
Compared to the initial period, the second one saw a 73 percent increase in 
the total number of call contracts traded, and a 61 percent increase in 
contracts per day. For puts the growth was even more impressive, being 319 
percent for total volume, and 296 percent for contracts per day. There was 
also a notable increase in total contract days (defined as the sum over all 
contracts of the number of days on which each contract traded), 
Table 2 
Gold p.m. fix price behavior. 
1981 1982 
First day April 2 $520.25 April 1 $327.25 
High April 6 $533.75 April 14 $366.50 
Low June 25 $446.50 June 21 $296.50 
Last day June 25 $446.50 June 30 $318.00 
Range $87.25 $70.00 
Table 3 
Option trading volume. 
Average 
Total volume Contract Number 
volume per day days a of contracts b 
1981 
Calls 8945 160 420 17 
Puts 2895 52 219 17 
1982 
Calls 15474 258 555 20 
Puts 9242 154 404 20 
aDefined as the sum over all contracts of the number of contracts traded each 
day. 
~l'his is the sum of the number of contracts which were available for trading at 
some point during the period. During each three-month period a number of 
contracts expired and new ones were authorized. 
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4. Empirical tests of boundary condition for EOE gold options 
We first consider empirical tests based on the violation of rational 
boundary conditions derived from Merton's (1973) stochastic dominance 
arguments. These tests require no distributional assumptions on the under- 
lying probability mechanism driving the gold price process. Although these 
tests are not particularly strong, if the market is inefficient with respect to 
simple information, it is improbable that it will be efficient with respect to 
some which is more complex or less freely available. For notational 
convenience we define 
C =call option price, 
P = put option price, 
K = exercise price, 
S = security price (gold), 
t = time to maturity, 
r = continuously compounded risk free rate. 
Unfortunately, we only have closing price data and so mis-specification 
due to the resultant non-simultaneity is possible. Additionally, in some cases 
there is little contractual volume. These realistic imperfections serve to reduce 
the importance of observed violations of these tests. Moreover, observed 
arbitrage opportunities may be defused by transaction costs. 
Merton (1973) establishes the following boundary conditions for American 
puts and calls assuming the absence of dividend payouts to the underlying 
security: 
C> S - K e  -r', (1) 
P>=K-S. (2) 
Since dividends are not paid to gold these boundary conditions must hold. 
Otherwise the EOE gold options market must be deemed inefficient in that 
arbitrage opportunities are available. 
We examined boundary condition (1) for r values from 0.02 to 0.20. This 
allowed us to observe the sensitivity of the violation frequency to a plausible 
range for prevailing risk free rates. Table 4 presents the results. For calls only 
the number of violations at the lowest interest rates represent unambiguous 
violations of the boundary conditions. Three violations in 1981 and no 
violations in 1982. With regard to boundary condition (2), thirty-one viola- 
tions were observed in 1981 and thirty-seven violations in 1982. However, 
a majority of these arbitrage opportunities dissipate once both transac- 
tion costs and the non-simultaneity of quoted gold and put prices are taken into 
account. These unambiguous violations occurred in options within five days 
of expiration. As is well known, option prices frequently behave erratically 
near expiration. Also, none of the above violations persisted to the next day. 
J.B.F.--E 
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Table 4 
Number of violations of the rational boundary condition. 
Interest rate (%) 




Calls 3 ~ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 9 420 
1982 
Calls 0 a 0 0 0 0 3 6 14 23 40 555 
aNumber of unambiguous violations. 
Another empirical test of rational boundary conditions is based on option 
price convexity. Ceteris paribus, in the absence of dividend payouts the 
values of an American call option and an American put option are convex in 
their exercise price [Merton (1973)-I. In other words, given exercise prices 
K~ < K 2 < K 3 such that 
K2 = qK1 +(1 --q)K 3, (3a) 
then 
C(K2) =< qC(KI) +(1 -q)C(K3) , (3b) 
and 
P(K2) < qP(K~) +(1 -q)e(K3). (3c) 
This is an important test since its violation permits the construction of a 
butterfly spread position to gain arbitrage profits. This position involves 
buying the two options with exercise prices K1 and K 3 and writing the 
intermediate option. 
For the butterfly spread test, we examined all possible combinations of 
those calls or puts with positive volume on each day. Table 5 presents the 
results. 
For calls, the number of violations was lower in 1982, again absolutely 
and relatively. For puts, while the absolute number of violations increased, 
the relative frequency decreased. In all cases, the mean and even the 
maximum dollar amounts were within transactions costs to the public. Since 
we do not know their transactions costs, it is not clear whether or not floor 
brokers and market makers could profit from the opportunities. 
In the majority of cases, the call violations involved an option that was 
deep out of the money. These options often are mis-priced by the Black- 
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Table 5 
Number and magnitude of convexity test violations. 
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Number of Standard 




Calls 26 $1.46 $1.63 $8.50 173 
Puts 1 $2.00 n.a. $2.00 30 
1982 
Call 24 $1.91 $2.22 $7.50 421 
Puts 8 $1.24 $0.79 $2.50 404 
Scholes (1973) formula, though this phenomenon does not invalidate the 
apparent violation. In addition, there were three occasions in 1981 when a 
violation existed for two consecutive days. There was one such case for puts 
and one for calls in 1982. 
5. Call-put parity and the risk free rate 
Stoll (1969) established a relationship between the price of call and put 
options written on the same underlying asset and with the same expiry date. 
Under quite general distributional assumptions on asset price behavior and 
in the absence of dividends, 
C _ P = S _ K e  -,t. (4) 
This call-put parity only holds when it is not rational to prematurely 
exercise the options. In the absence of dividends it is never rational to 
prematurely exercise an American call option [Merton (1973)]. However, this 
is not the case for American put options. Suppose the price of the underlying 
security fell so low that the strategy of immediate exercise of the American 
put option and investment of the proceeds at the prevailing risk free rate 
earned a payoff at the option's expiration of more than the exercise price. 
Because, at expiration, the American put can be worth at most its exercise 
price, the immediate exercise strategy dominates the holding strategy and 
hence under these circumstances premature exercise would be rational. 
Indeed, there exists a critical stock price for each time point at which 
premature exercise becomes optimal. This critical stock price as a function of 
time plays a fundamental role in the numerical procedures devised for the 
valuation of American put options [Brennan and Schwartz (1977)]. 
We can use eq. (4) and market call and put prices to infer a market 
implied risk free rate (IRFR). This is of practical as well as theoretical 
interest. Practitioners use eq. (4) to generate positions known as 'forward' 
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and 'reverse conversions' [Klemkosky and Resnick (1979, 1980) and Anders 
(1982)]. 2 Deviations of the IRFR from the prevailing market risk free rate 
indicate the possibility of arbitrage profits. 
Due to the possibility of premature exercise it is reasonable to expect that 
for deep in the money American put options eq. (4) will be significantly 
distorted. However, for American put options which are not in the money 
the probability of premature exercise is quite small and hence we may use eq. 
(4) to obtain approximately unbiased IRFRs. Assuming eq. (4) holds, tables 
6a and 6b provide summary statistics on the resultant IRFRs. The mean 
IRFR tends to be much lower for the higher exercise price contracts than for 
the lower ones demonstrating a systematic downward bias induced by the 
deep in the money American put options. In addition, the mean IRFRs are 
lower for 1982 than for 1981 consistent with the general decrease in interest 
rates over that period. In line with common practice we will use the U.S. 
Treasury bill (T-bill) rate as a proxy for the prevailing risk free rate 
[Klemkosky and Resnick (1979, 1980)]. We now indicate strategies for 
achieving arbitrage profits under our assumptions. 
If the IRFR exceeds the T-bill rate then the EOE gold options trader will 
engage in a forward conversion guaranteeing a risk free lending rate greater 
than the T-bill rate. This implied risk free lending rate is a priori certain 
since the forward conversion involves buying gold, writing an American call 
on gold (which will never be prematurely exercised), and buying an American 
put on gold, which will only be prematurely exercised to the trader's 
advantage. 
If the T-bill rate exceeds the IRFR, arbitrage profits may be illusory. By 
engaging in a reverse conversion the EOE gold options trader generates an 
initial borrowing rate less than the T-bill rate. However, this borrowing rate 
is not a priori certain. Recall, a reverse conversion involves shorting gold, 
buying an American call on gold and writing an American put on gold. The 
American put may be exercised prematurely to the trader's disadvantage 
thereby increasing the realized borrowing rate of return. As the American put 
option becomes deeper in the money the possibility of premature exercise 
increases, rendering the IRFR an inappropriate measure of the realizable 
borrowing rate. 
As Anders (1982) reports, traders on the U.S. option exchanges engage in 
both forward and reverse conversions using, as is consistent with our results, 
at the money options on non-dividend paying stocks. He reports that the 
former are rare (as one would expect as they are true arbitrage oppor- 
tunities), but that the latter are apparently not uncommon. 
2Forward conversions involves buying the underlying stock and a put, and selling a call with 
the same exercise price and maturity as the put. Reverse conversion involves shorting the stock, 
selling a put, and buying a call, again matching exercise prices and maturities for all three 
contracts. 
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Table 6a 
Implied risk free rate (IRFR) - -  summary statistics 1981. 
Sample Standard 
Contract size Mean error 
May 475 5 0.156 0.897 
May 500 24 0.218 0.297 
May 525 13 0.145 0.082 
May 550 4 0.077 0.072 
Aug 450 5 0.035 0.196 
Aug 475 20 0.121 0.102 
Aug 500 32 0.142 0.031 
Aug 525 18 0.114 0.024 
Aug 550 2 0.093 0.017 
Nov 450 1 0.149 n.a. 
Nov 475 5 0.132 0.021 
Nov 500 9 0.123 0.023 
Nov 525 1 0.091 n.a. 
Nov 550 2 0.072 0.029 
Feb 450 1 0.145 n.a. 
Feb 475 1 0.108 n.a. 
Feb 500 1 0.115 n.a. 
Table 6b 
Implied risk free rate (IRFR) - -  summary statistics 1982. 
Sample Standard 
Contract size Mean error 
May 300 1 -0.019 n.a. 
May 325 17 0.602 2.024 
May 350 23 0.287 1.144 
May 375 11 0.120 0.672 
May 400 1 0.168 n.a. 
May 425 1 0.100 n.a. 
Aug 300 15 0.013 0.279 
Aug 325 37 0.104 0.035 
Aug 350 50 0.099 0.039 
Aug 375 21 0.085 0.020 
Aug 400 7 0.097 0.025 
Aug 425 3 0.052 0.011 
Nov 300 11 0.095 0.028 
Nov 325 24 0.085 0.039 
Nov 350 26 0.093 0.026 
Nov 375 8 0.089 0.017 
Nov 400 4 0.088 0.027 
Feb 300 5 0.076 0.004 
Feb 325 2 0.132 0.003 
Feb 350 1 0.094 n.a. 
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If such arbitrage opportunities occur on the long-established American 
exchanges it is not improbable that they exist on the EOE. The volatilities of 
the IRFRs as evidenced in tables 6a and 6b imply that they could exist. 
Restricting our attention to forward conversions, and assuming the corre- 
sponding U.S. Treasury bid yield appropriately measures the cost of borrow- 
ing, we identified 47 (out of 148) occasions in 1981 and 59 (out of 268) 
occasions in 1982 in which this implied risk free lending rate exceeded the 
U.S. Treasury bill bid yield. 
However, our preceding analysis has not taken into account the various 
transaction costs incurred in establishing forward conversions. Prohibitive 
transaction costs may transform apparent profits into losses. In order to 
appropriately adjust the implied risk free lending rate, we now investigage 
the transaction costs associated with forward conversions. 
We let To, T~,, and T~ denote the transaction costs incurred in writing a call, 
buying a put, and buying the underlying security, respectively. Table 1 details 
the transaction costs on EOE gold options. The commission charged on a 
purchase of gold at the London fixing is 0.25~o. On the forward conversion's 
expiration date the underlying security is delivered and in return the exercise 
price K is received. Sales of gold via the London fixing are commission-free. 
In the presence of these transaction costs, the call-put parity relationship 
becomes 
( C -  T~)- (P + Tp)-(S + T~)= - K e  -*t. (5) 
In implying this risk free lending rate we take T¢=$8/contract, Tp=$8/con- 
tract and T~=0.25~. 
Tables 7a and 7b provide a summary statistics on the resultant adjusted 
IRFRs. As would be expected, the implied risk free lending rates are reduced 
by these transaction costs. Furthermore, the degree of reduction is more 
pronounced for the short term to maturity options. To determine whether 
arbitrage opportunities remain, an appropriate risk free borrowing rate must 
be employed. 
If we continue to use the T-bill rate, arguing that this is the opportunity 
cost to a trader borrowing from himself to invest in the riskless forward 
conversion, transaction costs reduce the number of arbitrage opportunities to 
12 in 1981 and 13 in 1982. However, marginal investors cannot borrow at 
the T-bill rate. At best these investors may borrow from their broker over 
the very short term at a premium over and above the prevailing call loan 
rate. Following Rubinstein and Cox (1978), we approximate this very short- 
term borrowing rate by 3/4~o above the call loan rate. To approximate 
longer-term borrowing rates, the difference between the call loan rate plus 
3/4~ and the shortest term T-bill rate is added to the rate of interest on a T- 
bill maturing closest to the option's expiration date. 
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Table 7a 
Adjusted implied risk free rate - -  summary statistics 1981. 
Sample Standard 
Contract size Mean error 
May 475 5 -0.911 2.041 
May 500 24 -0.077 0.231 
May 525 13 -0.016 0.136 
May 550 4 --0.055 0.085 
Aug 450 5 -0.014 0.198 
Aug 475 20 0.079 0.103 
Aug 500 32 0.109 0.030 
Aug 525 18 0.085 0.027 
Aug 550 2 0.065 0.018 
Nov 450 1 0.127 n.a. 
Nov 475 5 0.112 0.021 
Nov 500 9 0.105 0.023 
Nov 525 1 0.077 n.a. 
Nov 550 2 0.057 0.031 
Feb 450 1 0.131 n.a. 
Feb 475 1 0.095 n.a. 
Feb 500 1 0.102 n.a. 
Table 7b 
Adjusted implied risk free rate - -  summary statistics 1982. 
Sample Standard 
Contract size Mean error 
May 300 1 -0.152 n.a. 
May 325 17 0.043 1.161 
May 350 23 -0.113 0.485 
May 375 11 0.000 0.841 
May 400 1 0.040 n.a. 
May 425 1 - 0.087 n.a. 
Aug 300 15 - 0.040 0.282 
Aug 325 37 0.057 0.040 
Aug 350 50 0.059 0.042 
Aug 375 21 0.051 0.024 
Aug 400 7 0.070 0.023 
Aug 425 3 0.025 0.013 
Nov 300 11 0.069 0.029 
Nov 325 24 0.066 0.039 
Nov 350 26 0.072 0.028 
Nov 375 8 0.071 0.013 
Nov 400 4 0.072 0.023 
Feb 300 5 0.058 0.004 
Feb 325 2 0.116 0.003 
Feb 350 1 0.078 n.a. 
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A comparison of these borrowing rates and the adjusted IRFRs indicate 
three arbitrage opportunities via forward conversions were to be found in the 
EOE gold options market in 1981, and two in 1982. All involved options 
close to maturity. In 1981, the three cases occurred in May options with 
three and two days to maturity, with two cases representing an opportunity 
which persisted over two days. In 1982, both cases occurred on the day 
before expiration. 
6. Summary and conclusion 
The EOE introduced options on gold in April 1981. These options have a 
particular attraction for empirical research since the underlying security pays 
no dividends. In this paper we have taken advantage of this feature in 
applying various tests of market efficiency. While we observed occasions of 
apparent mis-pricing these could be due to data problems, particularly non- 
simultaneity of quoted prices. 
We first employed tests based on Merton's (1973) rational boundary 
conditions. These indicated minimal deviations from market efficiency. 
Further, all of our tests indicated that these violations declined absolutely or 
relatively as the market became less new or thin. Next, we used call-put 
parity to infer an IRFR which provided an additional test of market 
efficiency. When the IRFR deviates from the prevailing risk free rate, traders 
may engage in arbitrage through establishing positions known as forward 
and reverse conversions. Our results indicate that, apart from the quality of 
our data, such opportunities may indeed have existed. However, once 
transaction costs were considered these arbitrage, opportunities were almost 
entirely eliminated. 
In summary, our analysis concludes that the EOE gold options market is 
efficient. At its inception, some possible pricing inefficiencies may have 
existed, but this finding is subject to caveats concerning the data. However, 
with the passage of time the number and magnitude of such inefficiencies has 
decreased. 
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